Preprint / Working Paper
Details
Citation
Hart RA & Ma Y (2013) Overtime Working and Contract Efficiency. Stirling Economics Discussion Paper, 2013-07.
Abstract
We present a wage-hours contract designed to minimize costly turnover given investments in specific training combined with firm and worker information asymmetries. It may be optimal for the parties to work ‘long hours' remunerated at premium rates for guaranteed overtime hours. Based on British plant and machine operatives, we test three predictions. First, trained workers with longer tenure are more likely to work overtime. Second, hourly overtime pay exceeds the value of marginal product while the basic hourly wage is less than the value of marginal product. Third, the basic hourly wage is negatively related to the overtime premium.
Keywords
Paid overtime, wage-hours contract, plant and machine operatives
JEL codes
- J41: Labor Contracts
- J33: Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
| Title of series | Stirling Economics Discussion Paper |
|---|---|
| Number in series | 2013-07 |
| Publication date online | 31/05/2013 |
| URL |